Book IV, Chapter III: Elections
WirTH regard to the elections of the Prince and the magistrates, which are, as I have said, complex acts, there are two modes of procedure, viz. choice and lot.14_ Both have been employed in different republics, and a very complicated mixture of the two is seen even now in the election of the Doge of Venice.
“Election by lot,” says Montesquieu,!5 “is of the nature of democracy.” I agree, but how isit so? ‘The lot,” he continues, “is a mode of election which mortifies no one; it leaves every citizen a reasonable hope of serving his country.” But these are not the reasons.
If we are mindful that the election of the chiefs is a function of government and not of sovereignty, we shall see why the method of election by lot is more in the nature of democracy, in which the administration is by so much the better as its acts are less multiplied.
In every true democracy, the magistracy is not a boon but an onerous charge, which cannot fairly be imposed on one individual rather than on another. The law alone can impose this burden on the person upon whom the lot falls. For then, the conditions being equal for all, and the choice not being dependent on any human will, there is no particular application to alter the universality of the law.
In an aristocracy the Prince chooses the Prince, the government is maintained by itself, and voting is rightly established.
The instance of the election of the Doge of Venice, far from destroying this distinction, confirms it; this composite form is suitable in a mixed government. For it is an error to take the government of Venice as a true aristocracy.!® If the people have no share in the government, the nobles themselves are numerous. A multitude of poor Barnadotes never come near any magistracy, and have for their nobility only the empty title of Excellency and the right to attend the Great Council. This Great Council being
as numerous as our General Council at Geneva,” its illustrious
members have no more privileges than our simple citizens (cifoyens). It is certain that, setting aside the extreme disparity of the two Republics, the burgesses (/a bourgeoisie) of Geneva exactly correspond to the Venetian order of patricians; our natives (vazi/s) and residents (hadctants) represent the citizens and people of Venice; our peasants (faysans) represent the subjects of the mainland ; in short, in whatever way we consider this Republic apart from its size, its government is no more aristocratic than ours. The whole difference is that, having no chief for life, we have not the same need for election by lot.
Elections by lot would have few drawbacks in a true democracy, in which, all being equal as well in character and ability as in sentiments and fortune, the choice would become almost indifferent. But I have already said that there is no true democracy.
When choice and lot are combined, the first should be employed to fill the posts that require peculiar talents, such as military appointments ; the other is suitable for those in which good sense, justice, and integrity are sufficient, such as judicial offices, because, in a well-constituted State, these qualities are common to all the citizens.
Neither lot nor voting has any place in a monarchical government. The monarch being by right sole Prince and sole magistrate, the choice of his lieutenants belongs to him alone. When the Abbé de Saint-Pierre 18 proposed to multiply the councils of the King of France and to elect the members of them by ballot, he did not see that he was proposing to change the form of government.
It would remain for me to speak of the method for recording and collecting votes in the assembly of the people ; but perhaps the history of the Roman policy in that respect will explain more clearly all the principles which I might be able to establish. It is not unworthy of a judicious reader to see in some detail how public and private affairs were dealt with in a council of 200,000 men.?9