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Summary: What Is Art?

Summary

Chapters I-IV: The cost of art and the failure of beauty

Tolstoy begins with the labour required to produce a large opera. Rehearsals consume the time and energy of performers and workers, many of whom are subjected to humiliation so that a wealthy audience can receive a brief entertainment. This example establishes the book’s governing demand: art must provide a value sufficient to justify the sacrifices made in its name. The prestige of art cannot itself answer that demand.

He then asks what art is. The common reply identifies art with beauty, but theories of beauty disagree about whether it is objective, subjective, spiritual, harmonious or merely pleasurable. Tolstoy surveys modern aesthetics and concludes that its abstract language conceals a circular standard: art is said to produce beauty, while beauty is recognised through what accepted art produces. Taste cannot resolve the problem because cultivated preferences differ and are formed by the institutions under examination.

Chapter V: Art as the communication of feeling

Tolstoy replaces beauty with a communicative definition. Art begins when someone, having experienced a feeling, intentionally uses an external form so that others can experience that feeling too. A boy narrating an encounter with a wolf, a person describing grief, or a composer arranging sounds can each make art if listeners are drawn into the emotion conveyed. The medium and social status of the maker are secondary.

Art is thus as necessary to emotional life as language is to intellectual life. It links people across distance and time, preserving and circulating human experience. The definition is descriptive rather than yet evaluative: it identifies art through the transmission of feeling but does not imply that every transmitted feeling is good.

Chapters VI-VIII: How elite art became separated from common life

Societies judge feelings through their deepest understanding of life’s purpose. Tolstoy argues that medieval Christian culture, despite its failures, possessed a shared religious criterion. During and after the Renaissance, privileged Europeans increasingly abandoned that common orientation while retaining their social power. Pleasure and beauty replaced religious perception as the standard of art.

Aesthetic theory then supplied intellectual protection for the preferences of the wealthy. Art produced for a minority grew costly, exclusive and remote from ordinary experience. Its defenders claimed that great art need not be understood by most people because only a cultivated elect possesses the required taste. Tolstoy rejects this defence: an activity described as one of humanity’s highest goods cannot be justified by its inaccessibility to the majority whose labour supports it.

Chapters IX-X: Impoverished subject matter and cultivated obscurity

Separated from universal moral concerns, upper-class art repeatedly communicates a narrow range of feelings: pride, sexual desire and weariness with life. The scarcity of sincere subject matter encourages novelty for its own sake. Artists seek increasingly unusual forms and sensations because familiar devices no longer stimulate an audience accustomed to luxury.

Tolstoy examines symbolist and decadent writing to argue that obscurity has been mistaken for profundity. Art may be unfamiliar without being worthless, but a work that cannot transmit its feeling to people capable of receiving its medium has failed as art. He contrasts difficult elite production with folk songs, stories and religious narratives whose feelings remain intelligible across social divisions.

Chapters XI-XIV: Counterfeit art and the institutions that sustain it

Counterfeit art imitates the appearance of communication without a sincerely experienced feeling. Tolstoy identifies four common methods: borrowing established themes and associations; imitating descriptive detail; producing striking effects; and maintaining interest through plot, novelty or information. These devices may entertain or impress, but they do not by themselves create the union characteristic of art.

Professionalism, criticism and artistic schools multiply such counterfeits. Dependence upon payment encourages production when no genuine feeling demands expression. Critics explain works that have failed to communicate and convert reputations into standards. Schools teach techniques and models but cannot teach the inner necessity from which sincere art arises. Tolstoy’s lengthy account of Wagner’s Ring presents spectacle, mythic borrowing and accumulated effects as an example of cultural authority manufacturing admiration.

Once taste has been trained by counterfeits, people lose confidence in direct experience. Famous names and learned judgements replace the question of whether a work actually creates shared feeling. Tolstoy argues that the quantity of genuine art within respected culture is consequently much smaller than its institutions acknowledge.

Chapter XV: The formal quality of art

The immediate sign of art is infectiousness: the receiver feels joined to the maker and to other receivers. The strength of this experience depends on three conditions. Individuality gives the feeling a distinctive character rather than a conventional form. Clearness enables the audience to recognise and enter it. Sincerity shows that the artist is expressing something genuinely felt rather than calculating an effect.

Sincerity is decisive because it animates individuality and clarity. Tolstoy does not equate quality with polished technique. A technically simple work can communicate with exceptional force, while a highly accomplished production can remain emotionally empty.

Chapter XVI: The moral value of art

Having explained artistic effectiveness, Tolstoy turns to subject matter. Good art communicates feelings consistent with the highest moral perception available to its age. For him, that perception is the movement towards universal fellowship and the recognition of every person’s equal human worth.

He distinguishes religious art, which communicates feelings connected with humanity’s moral direction, from universal everyday art, which shares simple emotions accessible to people across social boundaries. Both unite. Bad art communicates feelings that divide people, celebrate domination or serve the pleasures of an exclusive group. A work can therefore be genuine and infectious art while remaining morally bad.

Chapters XVII-XVIII: The consequences and purpose of art

Corrupted art wastes labour, distorts judgement and educates people into false values. It strengthens class separation, sensuality, patriotic hostility and admiration for power. Children and ordinary readers learn to distrust spontaneous moral responses when celebrated works are presented as unquestionably great.

Against this fragmentation, Tolstoy identifies brotherly union as the direction of human life. Art can make that union experientially present. Moral teaching stated as doctrine may remain abstract; art enables people to feel the lives of others from within and can weaken the isolation between persons.

Chapters XIX-XX: The art of the future

Future art should not be a specialised possession of a wealthy minority. Artists will emerge from every class, subjects will arise from shared human life, and forms will become comprehensible without dependence on professional criticism. Greater accessibility will not require uniformity or crude simplification. It will enlarge the range of people whose feelings and experiences enter culture.

Tolstoy ends by connecting art with science. Genuine science should investigate what matters for human well-being and moral life; genuine art should communicate the feelings associated with that knowledge. Both have been corrupted by professional status and trivial specialisation. Reformed, they would cooperate in replacing division with conscious human fellowship.

The appendices

The appendices supply examples and supporting material connected with Tolstoy’s criticism of contemporary literature and culture, including translated passages discussed in the main argument. They clarify the objects of his polemic but do not alter the book’s central progression from definition, through institutional criticism, to a morally directed conception of future art.

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