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Open Philosophy LibraryThe Discourses Of Epictetus – Book IIEpictetus

The Discourses Of Epictetus – Book II

By Epictetus

Book II of Epictetus' Discourses examines how Stoic principles become reliable conduct. Across twenty-six conversations, Epictetus joins confidence with moral caution, explains tranquillity and indifference, explores duty, anxiety, friendship and discussion, and shows how appearances must be tested before assent. He challenges students who possess philosophy only in words and argues that freedom requires consistent application of beliefs about good and evil. Recorded by Arrian and translated here by George Long, the book is a practical study of aligning judgement, social responsibility and action under pressure.

Translator or editor
George Long
Publication
Early 2nd century CE (c. 108 CE)
Genre
Stoic philosophical discourses
Era
Ancient Philosophy

About this work

Book II of The Discourses of Epictetus investigates the gap between understanding a philosophical principle and being able to use it when circumstances become difficult. Its twenty-six conversations move through courage, tranquillity, indifference, duty, anxiety, friendship, logic and the disciplined examination of appearances. The opening argument distinguishes the proper objects of confidence and caution. External events do not determine moral good or evil and should therefore be approached without servile fear. Judgement and choice can go wrong and deserve careful attention. Human beings create disturbance when they reverse these attitudes, fearing death or disapproval while treating their own assent, desire and conduct carelessly. Epictetus describes external things as indifferent, but this does not mean that they should be handled negligently. Health, relationships, public responsibilities and practical outcomes supply the material upon which character acts. They should be used with attention without being treated as possessions upon which happiness depends. Magnanimity is compatible with care because seriousness belongs to the manner of action rather than to ownership of the result. The book connects ethics with social identity. Terms such as parent, sibling, citizen and friend carry expectations of appropriate behaviour. Another person's failure does not automatically cancel one's own duty. Philosophy asks what kind of response preserves reason, justice and character, even when relationships are strained. Discussion, logic and speech are assessed by their practical purpose. Argument should reveal contradiction and help a person see that mistaken action frustrates his own deeper aims. Eloquence becomes dangerous when admired for display alone. Intellectual tools are valuable when they improve assent and conduct, not when they provide a costume of philosophical seriousness. The later chapters focus on struggle against persuasive impressions. Knowledge remains ineffective unless it is practised until it can be recalled in moments of desire, fear and anger. Book II is consequently a demanding account of consistency: tranquillity and friendship become possible when values cease to shift with convenience and the governing faculty learns to act upon what it claims to know.

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