John Locke's Second Treatise of Government is one of the central works of modern political philosophy. Written during the political conflicts of seventeenth-century England and published anonymously around 1689–1690, it rejects the claim that rulers inherit absolute authority from Adam. In its place Locke develops an account of natural equality, individual rights, government by consent and a people's right to resist rulers who betray their trust.
The work begins before political society. Locke's state of nature is a condition of freedom and equality governed by natural law. It is not necessarily a state of constant violence. Human beings may direct their actions and possessions without dependence upon another person's arbitrary will, but freedom is not licence. Because all are equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in life, health, liberty or possessions.
Natural law must nevertheless be enforced. In the state of nature each person possesses executive power to restrain offences and seek reparation. This arrangement is insecure because people are partial in their own cases and lack a commonly recognised judge. The state of war arises when force is used without right, whether outside political society or by a ruler who abandons law.
Property forms a major part of Locke's argument. A person owns his body and labour. By mixing labour with resources held in common, he may make them his property, provided enough and as good remains for others and nothing is allowed to spoil. The invention of money, accepted by consent, enables durable accumulation and creates inequalities beyond immediate use.
Families and other relationships do not supply a model of absolute monarchy. Parental power exists to protect and educate children until they can govern themselves by reason. Conjugal, domestic and master–servant relations have distinct purposes and limits. Locke repeatedly separates these powers from political authority.
Political society begins when individuals consent to form one community and place the enforcement of natural law in public hands. Majority decision is necessary if the community is to act as one body. People establish government to protect property in Locke's broad sense: their lives, liberties and estates.
Legislative power is supreme within government, but it is not arbitrary. Legislators must govern through standing public laws, aim at the good of the people, avoid taking property without consent and refrain from transferring law-making authority to others. The executive applies law and handles circumstances requiring discretion. Federative power directs foreign affairs.
Locke calls responsible discretion used for the public good “prerogative.” It may act where law is silent, and sometimes against its literal direction when urgent necessity demands. Yet prerogative is not a personal licence: the people remain the ultimate judges when rulers claim public welfare while pursuing private power.
The later chapters distinguish conquest, usurpation and tyranny. Successful force does not by itself create legitimate government. A conqueror gains no rightful authority over innocent people or their property. A usurper occupies an office without right, while a tyrant uses public power for private ends.
Government is dissolved when legislative institutions are altered without authority, elections are obstructed, the people are delivered to foreign power or rulers abandon the execution of law. In such cases resistance is not rebellion against lawful order. Locke argues that rulers who break the political trust place themselves in opposition to the community.
The work's influence is immense, but modern readers should also examine its tensions. Locke's language of equality coexists with exclusions in his historical world, and his theory of appropriation has been used in disputes about colonial possession. Reading the Second Treatise well therefore requires both understanding its defence of limited government and testing how consistently its principles protect every person's freedom.
This edition preserves Locke's Preface and all nineteen chapters. The original numbered sections remain visible because they are integral to the argument and allow precise navigation.